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1. Law of Reason School as a new version of Natural Law  
From the end of the 18th century, the most sophisticated version of Natural Law considered 
as the Kant type of Doctrine of Reason (School of Reason) was increasingly getting 
accepted in Hungarian Legal Philosophical Thinking. The expansion of initially “hated” 
Kantian thoughts1 started with a change of approach ongoing in Austria, when the Karl 
Anton Martini’s concept favored in royal circles was officially replaced by views of Franz 
Zeiller and Franz Egger accepting Kantian doctrine at the University of Vienna.2 This new 
critical theory of reason was firstly adopted within the Natural Law by Mihály Szibenliszt, 
so that he could give a way to such philosophers as inter alia Antal Virozsil, Imre Csatskó, 
István Bánó.3 
At the end of the 19th century the theoretical summary of Law of Reason can be found 
in several works of Tivadar Pauler, who himself shared its principles but dealt with Law of 
Reason mainly in a historical way.4 The same approach may also be recognized in views of 
Ferenc Deák and József Eötvös on State.5 The Doctrine of Reason based on Kantian 
philosophy of law and relying on not infallible, but correctable pure reason tends to explore 
the rights and obligations of both the individual and its community. The former ones are 
deduced from the dignity of a person, the latter ones are defined within the framework of a 
society (societas) formed by persons sui iuris to achieve a common goal. The private-law 
institutions and relations based on Roman law, but reinterpreted by Natural Law provide a 
framework for the public-law relations, whose precise development was due to the 
appearance of the modern State’s concept devised by Natural Law.6 
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2. New interpretation of societal domestic 
From the social theoretical point of view amongst the societies the society of man’s house 
(societal domestic), in the proper sense the family (familiar) and the State (civitas) were 
highlighted by the Doctrine of Reason as an Academic Discipline of its time, like those 
emerged as a result of reasonableness given by nature, and they can be found in every human 
community as the universal formations.7 Apart from the fact that the establishment of State 
was based on the individuals by Doctrine of Reason – on the contrary, formerly the role of 
heads of families was emphasized when contracting the State Treaty8 – in respect of the State 
a meaningful importance was attributed to the family communities. The family was regarded 
as an essential point in the field of establishment and sustenance of the State. According to its 
general view, the Natural Law contains rules explorable by Pure Reason also regarding the 
terrain of family, which could be transposed into Positive Law created by the State. Its 
consequence is that the secular legislation regarding family and in particular the rules on 
marriage – owing to the universal characteristic feature of Natural Law – can be put on the 
basis of Natural Law. Besides it from the point of view of the State the legislation based on 
canonical or other religious beliefs could be no more but complementary. 
The abstraction of Law of Reason is also predominated when interpreting the family as 
society, thus its establishment – as would normally be the case of all societies – was 
founded on individuals. The Kantian formal and material defining approach was applied by 
the conception of Law of Reason.9 From a formal viewpoint relationship between spouses 
was basically understood by a family community (societas coniugalis), from which later 
the relationship between parents and their children (societas parentalis) can be descended. 
In the material sense the unity of these persons is understood by the family community, to 
which the relation between masters and servants (societas herilis) do not belong according 
to a newer concept in particular in Mihály Szinbenliszt and István Bánó’s interpretations. 
This last relationship was not considered to be a real societas by certain Natural Law 
Philosophers, since it lacked the common goal as one of the basic and coherent elements of 
societas.10 
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According to Szibenliszt the relationship between masters and servants (societas herilis) cannot be 
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3. Conjugal Partnership (societas coniugalis, matrimonium)  
The Law of Reason approach views the community of spouses from the perspective of 
equality. This improved version of Natural Law does not already deals with matrimony in a 
context that would lead to the conclusion of assessing the institution of marriage exclusively 
on a theological basis. In both cases of societies referring to State and marriage it is 
emphasised that they are based on the treaty of equal persons possessing free will and choice.  
From the doctrine of Natural Law, according to which the State is considered to be 
maxima societas – by the explanation of which the most underlined principle is that all 
societies established in State ought to be recognised by the State – results, that State claims 
the recognition of marriage without contesting certain rights of clergy.11 The fact that the 
marriage is considered to be a shared life of a man and a woman is also deduced from the 
legal attribute of State, according to which it is regarded as perennial or immortal in the 
legal sense (the State is not terminated by extinction of each generation).12 Therefore, the 
marital cohabitation can be defined as a contract (pactum matrimoniale), according to 
which two persons of different sexes declare their intention to undertake mutual rights and 
obligation for achieving a common and a durable goal.13  
The further requirements deriving from the character of matrimony as society are the 
mutual consent (verus consensus) and that the fulfillment arising from rights and 
obligations shall tend to possible services (possibilitas praestationis).14 Rights and 
obligations of spouses can be revealed from the purpose and function of marriage, however, 
taking the framework of a marital contract into consideration. Therefore the spouses are 
mutually entitled to freedom of action, according to which either party can do anything in 
accordance with achieving the purpose of marriage.  Consequently, all the actions should be 
ignored, which are incompatible with the intended function of the wedding. As regards the 
enforcing rights mutual obligations arise between spouses, against which any marital 
partner act, then his or her action can be interpreted in a broader sense as a treachery or 
faithlessness (perfidia), ad absurdum as adultery (adulterium).15  
 
There exist certain rights and obligations, even their violation listed by Natural Law 
Doctrine of Reason, as follows: 
− right and obligation of cohabitation (ius et officium conhabitandi), the action 
against it is interpreted as desertion (desertio) and from which a legitimate demand 
arises to fulfil this obligation, that is to return  
− right and obligation, under which we abandon ourselves to our spouse 
(monogamia), and violation of which manifests itself as polygamy (polygamia) 
−  right and obligation of faithfulness towards the spouse (ius et officium ad fidem 
coniugalem), that is the ignoration of any kinds of relationship with another 
                                                                                                                                                   
statements suggest that he considers subordination as a characteristic of Public Law and not a 
Privat Law, an in the realm of the latter equality of rights must prevail. 
11  SZIBENLISZT, 39. §, 46; VIROZSIL, 115. §, 257.  
12  SZIBENLISZT, 16. §, 18; VIROZSIL, 76. §, 149; BÁNÓ, 214. §, 207–209. Francisci Nobilis de Zeiller: 
Jus naturae privatum [Natural Private Law]. Editio Germanica tertia Latine reddita a Francisco 
Nobili de Egger, Viennae, apud Car, Ferdinandum Beck, MDCCCXIX, 189.  
13  ZEILLER–EGGER, 186; SZIBENLISZT, 20. §, 25; BÁNÓ, 217. §, 211; VIROZSIL, 78. §, 153.  
14  ZEILLER–EGGER, 186; SZIBENLISZT, 20. §, 25; BÁNÓ, 217. §, 211; VIROZSIL, 78. §, 153.  
15  SZIBENLISZT, 20. §, 25; BÁNÓ, 217. §. 211; VIROZSIL, 78. §, 153.  
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partner offending the existence of their marriage, whoes violation is in a strict 
sense regarded as adultery (adulterium).16  
The institution of marriage is supposed to be a confidential, intimate relationship, under 
which by the unification of two natural persons the so-called “moral person” comes into 
existence. Therefore it refers to both partners, they act not on their own, but as an entity, 
and they may mutually exercise each other’s competence.17 
 
4. The Power of Making Decision in Matrimony 
The following question emerges whether the marriage is based on equal or unequal society, 
as well as according to which who is entitled to directing the family? The answer to it, in 
the light of the facts discussed above, cannot, therefore be as if the marital agreement fails 
to include a rule about the direction of family, then as a general rule the direction is 
considered to be the most equitable if it aims at the purpose and function of the family into 
full account.18  
Some Natural Law theorists state the view that such family direction proves to be the 
best for the purpose of the family, in which either party may exercise the right which can be 
fulfilled better than the other one. Consequently, as long as there is no reason to apply a 
different rule, either one or the other party is entitled to the decision-making power over 
family matters.19 Regarding the forming of decision-making power the School of Reason in 
a general sense refers to characteristics of societies, when it is declared that any association 
in case of doubt is to be regarded as egalitarian. The family matters should be arranged on 
the model of an egalitarian society until the achievement of the family goal is threatened.20 
The husband, however, should not take the decision-making power against the wife’ will,21 
but if the wife does not contradict the infringer, then the power as a result of her long-term 
tolerance which – in this case – shall be taken as an implicit acceptance, is legally 
considered to be conferred on him. However, the wife exercises the right of contradiction, 
then it might as well result in the termination of marriage, thus as the lack of mutual 
consent constitutes a reason for the termination of any society.22 
 
5. Law of Reason Concept on the Terminating Marriage 
In this context, the question of dissolution of marriage and divorce arises, in respect of which the 
Law of Reason recognizes the right to divorce in case of distress, despite the fact that it 
emphasizes the lifetime nature of marriage. In accordance with natural reason such a decision 
may be taken if sustaining the marital community of life would cause much more damage than 
its termination.23 The Law of Reason provides the answer – avoiding the notion of “nullity” – 
enumerates the reasons grouped together, which lead to the dissolution of marriage in the most 
typical way. According to it, the mutual end of consent (mutuus dissensus) needed for sustaining 
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20  SZIBENLISZT, 23. §, 30; BÁNÓ, 219. §, 214–215; VIROZSIL, 76. §, 151.  
21  SZIBENLISZT, 30, footnote; BÁNÓ, 219. §, 215.  
22  ZEILLER–EGGER, footnote, 193.  
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the marital community of life may even lead to divorce,24 provided the rights of third parties are 
not violated. Therefore, in the event of divorce, the efforts should be made to protect the rights 
of children as mush as possible. The consequence of agreement of both parties to get divorced 
results in fact, that no right or obligation derived from matrimony exists between parties any 
longer. The consensus on the dissolution of marriage, however, may not affect the children. 
Accordingly, certain natural law theorists in possession of a great deal of frequent experience 
claim if the compliance with obligation regarding children becomes impossible on account of 
divorce, the expulsion of wife should not be permitted.25 
The other cause leading to divorce, the Law of Reason noted, the incurable impotence 
(impotentia) emerging prior to contracting marriage, which precludes the achieving the aim of 
marrige. Conversely, if it occurs after contracting marriage, it cannot cause the termination of 
marriage.26 
The faithlessness (perfidia) also may result in the termination of marriage, which can be 
committed in several ways. The most obvious way proves to be the adultery or unfaithfulness 
towards the other spouse (adulterium), but the same problem emerges, if either party denies the 
marital obligation (denegatio officii coniugalis) manifested by the absolute and permanent 
refusal of the obligation (ex absoluta aversatio promanente), even with the mailicious evasion 
from it. Undoubtedly, the anti-life act (insidiis vitae structis) is considered to be the most serious 
case of marital infidelity.27 The further version of infidelity is regarded as the sexual deviances, 
as follows: the onanism (onania), the pederasty (paederastia) and sodomy (Sodomia).28 
According to the explanation of Law of Reason the use of genital organs for their sake, besides 
the abuse of nature, is opposed to the right of the other spouse, therefore it proves to be a type of 
breaches of contract. Eventually, the termination of marriage is also caused by death, because 
the marital rights and obligations relate to personality, in every respect.29  
 
6. Apprehension of engagement by the Law of Reason  
The apprehension of engagement (sponsalia) preceding marriage also refers to the issue of 
mutual consent, which is regarded as the basis of wedding. According to this interpretation 
the engagement, taking the nature of marriage into account is considered to be an undesired 
practice by the Law of Reason.30 As explained by the Law of Reason the legal criteria 
applied for contracts prevail concerning engagement, as well. In case, the parties get 
engaged the consequence results in the fact that both parties must give up any act leading to 
the termination of marriage or remending the fulfillment of it. This fact may, ultimately, 
restrict the free will which appears to be the most significant element of contracting a future 
marriage.31 
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quoddammodo limitare videtur” SZIBENLISZT, 24. §, 32. and ZEILLER–EGGER, 195; BÁNÓ, 222. §, 
219; VIROZSIL, 77. §, 153. 
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7. Conclusion 
In the concept of Natural Law the legitimacy of matrimony interpreted as a civil-law 
contract by pure reason demands the recognition of the State. It is considered not to be an 
option possible for the future spouses by Doctrine of Law of Reason. From a legal aspect 
besides the consent between the parties, the institution of marriage is validated by the act 
recognized by the State. Overall, the marriage is not apprehended as a sanctity by the Law 
of Reason contrary to Canon Law, but as a contract recognized by the State, belonging 
typically to the State competence. This is also shown by the fact, that the Doctrine of the 
Law of Reason in the question relating to the termination of marriage focuses on its 
contractual nature, but not the dissolution based on fault, so the disintegration of consensus 
appears to be the crucial aspect of this issue. 
